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STATEMENT OF BASIS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction: This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78A-4-103(2)Q). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Appellant asserts the fallowing issues: 
Issue 1: Was Appellee JPMorgan Chase Bank, N .A. ("Chase" or 
"Appellee")'s as yet unrecorded, purported interest in the property located at 
11213 S. Portobello Road, South Jordan, Utah (the "Property"), as an 
alleged successor to the Lender, Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. 
("TB W"), void as against a subsequent purchaser who takes the property for 
value, without notice? (R. at 7-8, 11-12, 34,105,228). 
Determinative law: U.C.A. Sections 57-3-103, 78B-6-1315(4), and 
78B-6-1301, et. seq. 
Issue 2: Was Appe1lant Chase's alleged prior beneficial interest in 
the Property nullified and released by reason of the default judgment granted 
by Judge Royal Hansen on December 19, 2011 (the "Default Judgment") as 
Appellant could be served by publication in the 2011 quiet title action as an 
unknown party, by reason of Appellant's failure to formalize its alleged 
beneficial interest until it recorded a Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust 
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dated January 31, 2013 (the "Assignment"), on February 6, 2013? (R. at 7-
8, 11, 34, 43, 96-99, 228). 
Determinative law: U.C.A. Sections 78B-6-1314, 1315(4), 78B-6-
1301, 78B-6-903. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-36: 
57-1-36. Trust deeds -- Instruments entitled to be recorded --
Assignment of a beneficial interest. 
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a beneficial interest 
under a trust deed, notice of assignment of a beneficial interest, notice of 
default, trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust property, and any 
instrument by which any trust deed is subordinated or waived as to priority, 
if acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to be recorded. The 
recording of an assignment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed or a 
notice of assignment of a beneficial interest does not in itself impart notice 
of the assignment to the trustor, or the trustor's heirs or personal 
representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by the trustor, or the 
trustor's heirs or personal representatives, to the person holding the note, 
bond, or other instrument evidencing the obligation by the trust deed. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-3-103: 
57-3-103. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against 
any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
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Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-903: 
78B-6-903. Necessary parties -- Unrecorded rights barred. 
A person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor or having a 
lien on the property, neither of which is properly documented or recorded in 
the proper office at the time of the commencement of the action, is not 
required to be made a party to the action. The proceedings and any judgment 
rendered are conclusive against the party holding the unrecorded conveyance 
or lien as if the person had been made a party to the action. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-1301: 
78B-6-1301. Quiet title --Action to determine adverse claim to 
property. 
A person may bring an action against another person to determine rights, 
interests, or claims to or in personal or real property. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-1314: 
78B-6-1314. Service of summons and conclusiveness of judgment. 
If service of process is made upon unknown defendants by publication, 
the action shall proceed against the unknown persons in the same manner as 
against the defendants who are named and upon whom service is made by 
publication. Any unknown person who has or claims to have any right, title, 
estate, lien, or interest in the property, which is a cloud on the title and 
adverse to the plaintiff, who has been served as above, and anyone claiming 
under him, shall be concluded by any judgment in the action even though the 
unknown person may be under a legal disability. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-1315( 4 ): 
78B-6-1315. Judgment on default -- Court must require evidence --
Conclusiveness of judgment. 
(4) The judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons named in the 
summons and complaint who have been served and against all unknown 
persons as stated in the complaint and summons who have been served 
by publication. 
6 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court's granting JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A. 's Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On review of a summary judgment, the party against whom the 
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all 
the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable 
to him. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). This is the 
same standard as that applied by the trial court. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 
P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit 
of a trial on the merits, the appellate court must review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the losing party, and affirms only where it appears 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even 
according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, 
Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for 
correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District Court for the 
State of Utah, Case No. 130412969, entitled "Order Granting Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.". 
Course of Proceedings 
Judge Royal Hansen granted a quiet title default judgment on 
December 19, 2011, case no. 100920234, as to a trust deed encumbering the 
Property which was dated April 19, 2007 ("Trust Deed") and which named 
TBW as Lender. (R. at 7-8). Notwithstanding this default judgment, Chase 
recorded an Assignment on February 6, 2013, challenging the validity of the 
default judgment as to itself, and claiming it had the right to foreclose on the 
Property by reason of the same Trust Deed. (R. at 11 ). This action was filed 
by Sterling Fiduciaries, LLC, trustee of Stone Unturned Trust "(Sterling"), 
which had purchased the Property from Kimberly A. McCrae and Kip L. 
McRae (the "McRaes") on August 24, 2011. (R. at 105). 
Disposition in Lower Court 
In the instant action below, Chase made a motion for summary 
judgment on September 4, 2014. (R. at 26). This motion was unopposed, 
and the lower court granted Chase summary judgment. (R. at 165-166). 
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New counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Sterling timely filed a motion for a new 
trial under Rule 59 (R. at 170), and the court vacated its prior ruling and 
gave Sterling until December 5, 2014 by which to respond to Chase's 
motion for summary judgment. (R. at 183). After Sterling's opposition and 
Chase's reply, the court heard argument on February 18, 2015. (R. at 253). 
Notwithstanding Sterling's objection to the proposed order (R. at 269), the 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant/ Appellee Chase on 
March 30, 2015. Plaintiff/Appellant Sterling timely filed a Notice of Appeal 
on April 22, 2015. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 19, 2007, Mc Raes executed a promissory note in favor of 
TBW in the original principle amount of $900,000.00 (the "Note") for a loan 
that they would use to purchase the Property. (R. at 46). 
2. The Nate was secured by the Property, as evidenced by a Trust Deed. 
(R. at 51). 
3. The Trust Deed named TBW as Lender, McRae as Borrower, First 
American Title as Trustee, and MERS as beneficiary and nominee for 
Lender. (R. at 51). 
4. According to the MERS Milestones provided by Appellee Chase's 
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counsel, TBW registered the Note and Trust Deed on May 15, 2007 naming 
itself as investor, and MERS then transferred the beneficial interest of the 
Trust Deed from TBW to "New Investor: 1003646 Bank of America, 
National Association, Trustee/Custodian for WAMU/WMMSC" on 
September 7, 2007. (R. at 69). 
5. TBW then transferred its servicing rights for the Note and Trust Deed 
to "FDIC as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank", which also named 
TBW as the "Old Servicer", on October 4, 2007. (R. at 69). 
6. FDIC, "as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank", then transferred 
its servicing rights to the new servicer, "JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. fka 
WAMU" on March 31, 2009. (R. at 69). 
7. Bank of America, National Assoc. Trustee/Custodian for 
W AMU/WMMSC, then apparently transferred its beneficial rights to "JP 
Morgan Chase Bank N.A. tka WAMU" on May 27, 2010 (R. at 69), all 
without any recording of a change of interest with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder or putting McRaes on notice of the same. (R. at 69). 
8. On October 19, 2010, McRaes filed a quiet title action, case no. 
100920234, naming TBW as defendant, in an action to determine an adverse 
claim to McRaes' Property under U.C.A. Section 78B-6-1301. (R. at 96-
99). 
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9. Consistent with paragraph 15 of the Trust Deed, only TBW, as Lender 
on the Trust Deed, was given notice ofMcRae's quiet title action. (R. at 
60). 
10.McRaes transferred their interests in the Property to Appellant 
Sterling on August 24, 2011 (R. at 105), after serving all unknown parties in 
the quiet title action by publication on at least two separate occasions, on 
May 24, 2011 and July 22, 2011. (R. at 228, para. 6). 
11. A Default Judgment was granted to McRaes by Judge Royal Hansen 
on December 19, 2011 which, consistent with the Default Judgment and 
language in the First Amended Complaint which it referenced, quieted title 
"by nullifying and releasing the trust deeds clouding title" to McRae' s 
Property. (R. at 98, 107-108). 
12.McRaes recorded a Quit Claim Deed that transferred the Property to 
Appellant Sterling on September 22, 2011, and recorded their Default 
Judgment at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on January 10, 2012. 
(R. at 105, 107-108). 
13.McRaes apparently continued making monthly payments on the Note 
through October, 2012. (R. at 43, para. 12). 
14.Appellee Chase finally made public its purported Assignment of the 
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beneficial interest under the Trust Deed it allegedly received from MERS, 
"AS NOMINEE FOR [TBW], ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS ... " on 
February 6, 2013, despite MERS having already transferred the beneficial 
interest it once had as nominee for TBW and its successors to Bank of 
America National Association, as Trustee, in paragraph 4, above. (R. at 85). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant seeks to reverse the ruling of the Third District Court, 
which "found no genuine issue of any material fact and Chase is granted 
summary judgment in its favor as a matter of law on all of Plaintiffs claims 
in this action." Despite the specific direction of Section 57-1-36, U.C.A. 
that "[ a ]ny ... assignment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed ... if 
acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to be recorded", and the 
limitations of an unrecorded interest as to subsequent purchasers for value, 
without notice under Section 57-3-103 U .C.A., Appellee failed to provide 
public notice of its alleged prior beneficial ownership interest under the 
Trust Deed until recording its Assignment on February 6, 2013. Until then, 
Appellant's predecessor, the McRaes, had no obligation to provide notice to 
Appellee of their quiet title action. 
12 
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Only TBW, the Lender on the Note and Trust Deed, was entitled to 
notice according to the Trust Deed notice provision at pargraph 15 thereof, 
and only TBW was properly named as a defendant in McRaes' quiet title 
action because there were no other parties of record with an alleged 
ownership interest in 2011. Therefore, Appellee's claim of a prior beneficial 
interest in 2010 was void as against Appellant, which purchased McRaes' 
Property for value, in good faith and without notice of Appellee's purported 
claim. Appellant also promptly recorded its Quitclaim Deed from McRaes. 
And under Section 78B-6-1315(4) U.C.A., a default judgment is 
''conclusive against all persons named in the summons and complaint who 
have been served and against all unknown persons as stated in the 
complaint and summons who have been served by publication." Id., 
emphasis added. Here, Appellee was not entitled to be named in the quiet 
title complaint or served because it had no documented beneficial ownership 
interest outside of the guarded MERS Milestones, and MERS is not 
challenging the default judgment, nor is it represented by counsel in this 
action. 
ARGUMENT 
Chase's only interest in the Property, other than that as a servicer, is 
due to an apparent Assignment in 2013 which is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser for value, in good faith, without notice. 
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Assignments of beneficial interest are effective as to subsequent third 
party good faith purchasers for value, when notice of the same is made 
public through the appropriate county recorder's office. Duffy Daugherty, 
Michigan State's football coach from 1954 to 1972, was quoted as saying, "I 
could have been a Rhodes Scholar, except for my grades." Likewise, 
Appellee could have been assured of notice of McRaes' quiet title action, 
and could have prevailed against the Appellant, a subsequent good faith 
purchaser for value and without notice of Appellee's claim, had Appellee 
only published notice of its alleged beneficial interest when it purportedly 
acquired it in May, 2010. But for nearly three years thereafter, Appellee 
recorded nothing. No one was put on notice of Appellee 's alleged interest. 
When the Assignment dated January 31, 2013 was finally recorded, 
the purpose given by counsel for Appellee was "merely to formalize and 
record of record the earlier assignment to [Appellee]." (R. at 33, last two 
lines). That formality was critical in protecting Appellee's claim as against 
Appellant. Instead, there was no hint to any third parties of notice of an 
earlier alleged assignment of beneficial interest to Appellee from the public 
record, nor any letter to McRaes from Appellee, the servicer of their Note. 
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In support of its argument below, Appellee cited Gregerson v. Jensen, 
669 P.2d 396, 397 (Utah 1983). (R. at 34). Gregerson discusses Utah's 
statute on the effect of failure to record, U.C.A. Section 57-3-103: 
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of 
it, if: 
(l)The subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) The subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." 
Id. at 398. 
In Gregerson, the buyers did not qualify for protection afforded 
certain subsequent purchasers under U.C.A. Section 57-3-103 because they 
did not record their own conveyance ( or contract). Id. at 398. However, 
Appellant here promptly recorded its Quitclaim Deed from McRaes, and 
Mc Raes promptly recorded their default judgment, all ahead of Appellee' s 
2013 Assignment, as evidenced in the record. (R. at 105, 107-108). 
Appellant is entitled to the protections of Section 57-3-103. 
It is undisputed that Appellee failed to timely publish notice of its 
purported beneficial interest in the Property until February 6, 2013. The 
MERS Milestones were not available to McRaes or Appellant before 
counsel for Appellee made the same available by attaching it to the motion 
for summary judgment in 2014. The records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder clearly revealed that TBW was the Lender and the still apparent 
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owner of the relevant Note to whom McRaes' obligation was owed. 
Regardless of MERS' alleged beneficial interest under the Trust Deed as a 
nominee for TBW, paragraph 15 of the Trust Deed is clear that notice is only 
required to be given to Lender, being TBW, and not its nominee or anyone 
else named in the transaction. Without diligence in recording critical 
documents such as assignments of beneficial interests under the Trust Deed, 
a purported unrecorded beneficial interest is void as to a subsequent third 
party purchaser for value, in good faith without notice, that promptly acts, 
according to U.C.A. Section 57-3-103. 
This is the case with Appellant. Appellant learned that McRaes might 
soon have a default judgment against their disinterested Lender, TBW. 
Based on the recorded documents pertaining to the Property, Appellant 
purchased McRaes' Property for valuable consideration, in good faith and 
without notice of any claim of beneficial interest by Appellee. And 
Appellant thereafter promptly recorded its Quitclaim Deed to the Property. 
The Trust Deed under which Appellee claims a beneficial interest was 
nullified and removed pursuant to a default judgment order of the Third 
District Court, after at least two publications of notice to all unknown 
persons who may claim an interest in Appellant's Property. 
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II. Chase was effectively served by publication in the 2011 quiet title 
action because its beneficial interest under a Corporate Assignment of 
Deed of Trust was not recorded until February 6, 2013. 
Appellee successfully claimed below that Appellant's claim should 
fail because the default judgment granted by Judge Royal Hansen "did not 
quiet title as to Chase's interest in the Property." (R. at 34). Quoting Utah 
Code Section 78B-6-1315( 4), Appellee argued that a quiet title order is only 
"conclusive against all the persons named in the summons and complaint 
who have been served and against all unknown persons as stated in the 
complaint and summons who have been served by publication." Id. 
(Emphasis added by counsel for Appellee, R. at 34). 
The parties hereto agree that neither Appellee nor the Lender TB W's 
nominee, MERS, were named in the quiet title action; however, in 2010 and 
2011, when that action was progressing, neither MERS, as a nominee for 
TBW, nor Appellee had any independently recorded ownership interest in 
the Note or Trust Deed which pertained to the Property. According to the 
MERS Milestones provided by Appellee's counsel, MERS had conveyed its 
original beneficial interest under the Trust Deed back in 2007, and had no 
further interest, as a nominee ofTBW or otherwise. Only Appellee's 
alleged beneficial interest is the subject of this action. MERS is not 
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contesting a lack of notice of the McRaes' default judgment, and is not 
represented in this proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-1314 also defines under what 
circumstances notice to unknown defendants by publication can be 
accomplished: 
78B-6-1314. Service of summons and conclusiveness of judgment. 
If service of process is made upon unknown defendants by publication, 
the action shall proceed against the unknown persons in the same manner as 
against the defendants who are named and upon whom service is made by 
publication. Any unknown person who has or claims to have any right, title, 
estate, lien, or interest in the property, which is a cloud on the title and 
adverse to the plaintiff, who has been served as above, and anyone claiming 
under him, shall be concluded by any judgment in the action even though the 
unknown person may be under a legal disability. 
Emphasis added. McRaes only obtained their default judgment after 
publishing notice to unknown defendants twice. (R. at 228, para. 6). 
Likewise, Appellant had no knowledge of a purported beneficial interest 
now claimed by Appellee. Appellee's claim should be concluded by Judge 
Hansen's Default Judgment of December 19, 2011, as an assignee claiming 
under TBW, who received service of process and simply failed to respond. 
Appellee cited in the lower court, Jackson Construction Company, 
Inc. v. Robert C. Marrs, et. al., 100 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Utah 2004) for the 
proposition that "Utah courts have repeatedly held that when a quiet title 
order is obtained through a default judgment, and it is later revealed that 
18 
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service was not properly effectuated on the parties-in-interest, the quiet title 
order is void." Id. (R. at 34). Unlike the instant action involving Appellee's 
unrecorded alleged beneficial ownership interest, Jackson Construction 
Company, Inc. involved a failure to serve even the owners of record in an 
adverse possession default judgment. Here, Appellee has no choice but to 
seek a non-judicial foreclosure to defend its alleged security interest in the 
Property. If this was a judicial foreclosure, Section 78B-6-903 states that 
unrecorded interests of alleged lienholders should be ignored. (R. at 270). 
After the alleged 2007 assignment by MERS which was only 
disclosed in the MERS Milestones, MERS had then transferred its beneficial 
interest. It had no more interest in the Property to convey, as a nominee of 
TBW or otherwise. 
These issues should be resolved in favor of Appellant, because a 
summary judgment was granted Appellee. On appeal, Appellant is entitled 
to have all the facts presented, and all inferences fairly arising therefrom, 
considered in a light most favorable to him. Winegar v. Froerer, 813 P.2d 
104 (Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
The Third District Court's grant of summary judgment to Appellee 
should be reversed, and the Court of Appeals should determine that the 
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default judgment granted by Judge Royal Hansen on December 19, 2011 is 
valid as to unknown persons served twice by publication, and that Appellee 
is one of those unknown parties. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals should 
find that Appellant is a subsequent purchaser of the Property for value, in 
good faith and without notice of Appellee's claim, and that Appellant's 
timely recording of its interest renders void Appellee's subsequent 
Assignment as to Appellant. Appellee should not be allowed to deprive 
Appellant of its Property, or the value thereof. 
DATED: September 15, 2015. 
Dwight pers 
Attorney for Appellant Sterling Fiduciaries, LLC, 
Trustee of Stone Unturned Trust. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Dwight Epperson, certify that on September 15, 2015, I served two 
copies of the attached Appellant's Brief upon J. Tayler Fox and James D. 
Gilson, counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to them by first 
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
James D. Gilson 
J. Tayler Fox 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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UTAH APPEL\.ATE coURiS 
ADDENDUM SEP 17 20\S 
In the Utah Court of Appeals case of Sterling Fiduciaries, LLC, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 20150358, no 
Addendum is required under Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Counsel for Appellant is relying upon the 30 page limit for briefs. 
Dated: September 17, 2015 
DwtglEpp\ierso 
Dwight J .L. Epperson Inc. 
Attorney for Appellant Sterling Fiduciaries, LLC 
